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Logical Pluralism$
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JC Beall and Greg Restall

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288403

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001

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Specific Objections

Specific Objections

(p.107) Chapter 9 Specific Objections
Logical Pluralism

JC Beall

Oxford University Press

This chapter turns to specific objections against logical pluralism. There are a number of objections to classical, intuitionistic, and relevant logic which are specific to those logics, and not to the scheme of pluralism as a whole. Since it makes sense not only to be a pluralist about logical consequence, but to be a pluralist who endorses each of classical, constructive, and relevant reasoning, it becomes obligatory to say something about such logic-specific objections. These objections relate to coherence and relevant models, relevance and explosion, intensionality and the slingshot, and constructivity and semantics.

Keywords:   logical pluralism, specific objections, relevant logic, logical consequence, coherence, relevance, intensionality, constructivity, semantics

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