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Logical Pluralism$
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JC Beall and Greg Restall

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288403

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001

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Constructive Logic

Constructive Logic

(p.60) (p.61) Chapter 6 Constructive Logic
Logical Pluralism

JC Beall

Oxford University Press

Intuitionistic logic, also known as constructive logic, is a particular account of logical consequence, at variance with both classical and relevant logical consequence. One way to introduce intuitionistic logic is by means of constructions. This chapter gives an account of constructive validity by first indicating what it is to construct a statement, and then instantiating Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT) cases with constructions: an argument is constructively valid if and only if a construction for the premises provides a construction for the conclusion. Before turning to constructions, the relationship between intuitionistic logic and intuitionism is discussed. Intuitionism maintains that constructive reasoning is required by the nature of mathematical entities themselves. The entities in question are constructions of the reasoner in intuition, and such entities have only the properties bestowed upon them by their construction.

Keywords:   constructive logic, intuitionism, logical consequence, constructions, Generalised Tarski Thesis, constructive reasoning

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