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Williamson on Knowledge$
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Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199287512

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001

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Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility

Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility

Chapter:
(p.161) 10 Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility
Source:
Williamson on Knowledge
Author(s):

Ram Neta

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0011

Timothy Williamson has urged us to regard the Gettier problem as insoluble and so to forego the search for the elusive ‘fourth condition’ on knowledge. He has also defended the popular thesis that knowledge is defeasible by the addition of further evidence. And finally, he has argued that an agent's evidence set consists of all and only those propositions that the agent knows to be true. The present chapter argues that, if we give up Williamson's identification of evidence with knowledge in favor of an alternative conception of evidence, then we can obtain a satisfactory solution to the Gettier problem, as well as an argument against the defeasibility of knowledge by the addition of further evidence.

Keywords:   Defeasibility, Gettier problem, Timothy Williamson, knowledge, evidence

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