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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
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Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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A Theory of Bondage (2006) *

A Theory of Bondage (2006) *

Chapter:
(p.113) 6 A Theory of Bondage (2006)*
Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Author(s):

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0006

This chapter draws a sharp distinction between the classical semantics of expressions, in the tradition of Tarski, and the non-classical semantics of expression-occurrences in the tradition of Frege. An occurrence-semantic theory of variable-binding is developed by assigning non-standard semantic values to expression-occurrences standing within the scope of a variable-binding operator, shedding light on a number of philosophically significant issues. The theory is applied to two seemingly unrelated controversies: whether or not genuine singular terms can be quantified into; and whether so-called E-type pronouns are closed descriptive terms (as with Evans and some of his critics) or bound variables (as with Geach).

Keywords:   anaphora, E-type, occurrence, quantifier, variable

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