Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 24 July 2019

Are General Terms Rigid? (2003) *

Are General Terms Rigid? (2003) *

Chapter:
(p.100) 5 Are General Terms Rigid? (2003)*
Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Author(s):

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0005

It has been said that besides proper names and certain other singular terms, natural-kind terms and certain other general (non-singular) terms are rigid designators. If so, what do these general terms rigidly designate, and what would it be for a general term to designate non-rigidly? It is argued that contrary to popular opinion, some general terms rigidly designate kinds or similar universals, while some definite descriptions are general terms that are non-rigid designators, e.g., ‘the color of the sky’. It is shown that the opposing view is committed to implausibly positing extremely unlikely ambiguities in both components of a predicate like ‘is blue’. Robert May's reply is rejoined.

Keywords:   description, Robert May, predicate, rigid, Soames

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .