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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
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Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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Demonstrating and Necessity (2002) *

Demonstrating and Necessity (2002) *

Chapter:
(p.67) 4 Demonstrating and Necessity (2002)*
Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Author(s):

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0004

This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to form the complete expression, while embracing the anti-Fregean thesis that demonstratives are directly referential. Against the former it is argued that demonstrations form part of the context, not the expression, and that consequently demonstratives are pure indexicals. A semantic rule for complex demonstratives is proposed and its philosophical implications explored.

Keywords:   context, demonstration, demonstrative, indexical, Kaplan

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