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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
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Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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Is De Re Belief Reducible to De Dicto? (1998) *

Is De Re Belief Reducible to De Dicto? (1998) *

Chapter:
(p.270) 15 Is De Re Belief Reducible to De Dicto? (1998)*
Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Author(s):

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0015

The title question is disambiguated. One reading is given an affirmative response, the other a negative. Quine's argument against reducibility is criticized, Kaplan's contrary argument that reducibility is required is also criticized, and Burge's response to Kaplan on Quine's behalf is also criticized. A modest form of reducibility is defended. Kaplan's argument is modified to show that modest reducibility of de re belief to de dicto shows more about the latter than the former.

Keywords:   Burge, Kaplan, Quine, reduction

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