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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
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Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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Relational Belief (1995) *

Relational Belief (1995) *

Chapter:
(p.249) 14 Relational Belief (1995)*
Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Author(s):

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0014

This chapter investigates the arguments and proposals made by Quine in ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’. Quine's proposal to distinguish two kinds of believing is criticized. It is shown using minimal assumptions that Quine's proposal to replace one sort of attribution of belief with another fails to preserve truth value, let alone content. A curious inconsistency is derived from Quine's response to Alonzo Church.

Keywords:   attitude, belief, proposition, quantifier, Quine, Alonzo Church

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