Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 July 2019

Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt (1995) *

Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt (1995) *

Chapter:
(p.230) 13 Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt (1995)*
Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Author(s):

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0013

This chapter proposes natural definitions for a variety of doxastic notions, including disbelief, doubt, and suspension of judgment. Some plausible axioms are considered. A number of questionable theorems, excluding the prospect of being of two minds, are derived from the union of the proposed definitions and axioms. An alternative basis is proposed. The so-called hidden indexical theory of Mark Crimmins, Stephen Schiffer, and John Perry is criticized.

Keywords:   disbelief, doubt, Kripke, Stephen Schiffer, John Perry, Mark Crimmins

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .