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Corporate Governance in JapanInstitutional Change and Organizational Diversity$
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Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284511

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284511.001.0001

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The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1

The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1

(p.330) 12 The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform1
Corporate Governance in Japan

Hideaki Miyajima (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses the introduction of the executive officer system as an alternative to the traditional insider board structure. As a result, since 1997 board sizes have decreased and a greater separation has been made between monitoring and management responsibilities. Some firms have also introduced outside directors and performance-related compensation schemes, such as stock options. The extent of these reforms among Japanese firms is examined using a survey-based Corporate Governance Score (CGS) for each corporation. Higher CGS scores are associated with better performance, a higher percentage of foreign shareholders, and a lower percentage of stable shareholders. However, among firms exposed to capital market pressures, the presence of strong employee participation also has a significant positive impact on the degree of reform and suggests a strong mutual reliance on capital markets and long-term employment among strongly performing Japanese firms.

Keywords:   Japanese economy, board of directors, non-executive directors, independence, shareholder rights, employee participation

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