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Faith and Reason$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199283927

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283927.001.0001

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Rational Belief

Rational Belief

Chapter:
(p.34) 2 Rational Belief
Source:
Faith and Reason
Author(s):

Richard Swinburne (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283927.003.0002

This chapter distinguishes six different kinds of rationality which a belief may possess. It may be rational in being probable, given the believer's evidence and his or her inductive criteria; or probable, given the believer's evidence and correct inductive criteria. Or it may be rational in being the result of what the believer regards as adequate investigation, or the result of adequate investigation by the believer's own criteria, or the result of adequate investigation by correct criteria. Or it may be rational in being brought about by some process satisfying some externalist (e.g., reliabilist) criterion. Correct criteria require a subject to investigate the truth of a proposition in so far as its initial probability is not very close to l or 0, there is an initial probability that investigation will change the probability, and having a true belief on the issue is important relative to other demands on the subject's time.

Keywords:   belief, investigation, evidence, probability

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