Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Contemporary Issues in Management Accounting$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alnoor Bhimani

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199283361

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283361.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 October 2019

Contract theory analysis of managerial accounting issues 1

Contract theory analysis of managerial accounting issues 1

Chapter:
(p.20) 2 Contract theory analysis of managerial accounting issues1
Source:
Contemporary Issues in Management Accounting
Author(s):

Stanley Baiman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283361.003.0002

Contract theory has become the dominant analytical research paradigm in managerial accounting over the last two decades, informing the managerial accounting literature both directly and indirectly. In the former case, formal contract theory modelling of managerial accounting issues has provided important insights into the design and role of managerial accounting systems. In the latter case, many of the hypotheses tested in recent behavioural and empirical research in managerial accounting have been derived from informal reasoning based on contract theory. Thus, any recipient of recent and future managerial accounting research would benefit from understanding contract theory. This chapter seeks to provide that understanding. It begins with a non-technical explanation of the contract theory model and a demonstration of how two types of incentive problem are formulated within that framework. It then discusses three managerial accounting issues to which formal contract theory analysis has been applied.

Keywords:   contract theory model, incentive conflict, variance analysis, performance measures, compensation systems

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .