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Sounds and PerceptionNew Philosophical Essays$
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Matthew Nudds and Casey O'Callaghan

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282968

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282968.001.0001

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Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events

Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events

Chapter:
(p.50) 3 Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events
Source:
Sounds and Perception
Author(s):

Roger Scruton (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282968.003.0003

This chapter argues for the view of sounds as secondary objects — that is, objects that are defined phenomenologically, in terms of their audible properties. Sounds are compared with smells, rainbows, and other secondary objects in order to show that there is a genuine and philosophically interesting class of such objects, and that it is possible to ascribe objective reality to them and to avoid private-language problems in describing them. It is also suggested that sounds are to be considered as events, and that this means that their individuation is essentially problematic.

Keywords:   sounds, secondary objects, secondary qualities, events, perception

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