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Putting Metaphysics FirstEssays on Metaphysics and Epistemology$
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Michael Devitt

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199280803

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001

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Global Response Dependency and Worldmaking *

Global Response Dependency and Worldmaking *

Chapter:
(p.121) 6 Global Response Dependency and Worldmaking*
Source:
Putting Metaphysics First
Author(s):

Michael Devitt (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.003.0007

‘Worldmaking’ is the antirealist doctrine that we make the known world with our concepts. It is Constructivism without a commitment to relativism. This chapter considers the relation between Worldmaking and the global response-dependency theory of concepts urged by Pettit. According to this theory all concepts are of dispositions to produce a certain sort of response in normal humans in normal conditions. Pettit denies that this theory leads to Worldmaking. The chapter argues that he is wrong. The theory leads to the view that all properties are response-dependent and this leads to Worldmaking. For that reason alone Pettit's theory of concepts should be rejected.

Keywords:   worldmaking, realism, constructivism, relativism, global response-dependency, Pettit

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