Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Aristotle on the Common Sense$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Pavel Gregoric

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199277377

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 September 2019

De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1 450a10

De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1 450a10

Chapter:
(p.99) 4 De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1 450a10
Source:
Aristotle on the Common Sense
Author(s):

Pavel Gregoric

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0009

This chapter offers an interpretation of the passage in De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1 which aims to show that memory does not belong to the rational capacity of the soul, but rather to what Aristotle calls the ‘primary perceptual capacity of the soul’ (proton aisthetikon) and, at one point, the ‘common sense’. The crucial step in the argument relies on the notion of the perception of time, which is investigated in some detail. It is argued that the perception of time requires joint operation of perception and imagination, and is hence the work of the sensory capacity of the soul. In other words, what Aristotle calls the ‘primary perceptual capacity of the soul’ and ‘common sense’ in this passage is the sensory capacity of the soul. This establishes the same reference for the phrase ‘common sense’ in De Partibus Animalium IV.10 and De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1.

Keywords:   common sense, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, De Partibus Animalium, perception, imagination, rational, non-rational, cognitive capacities, proton aisthetikon, koine aisthesis

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .