This chapter examines Aristotle's notion of perceptual discrimination, which he discusses in De Anima III.2 (426 b 8-427 a 16) and III.7 (431 a 20 b 1). In the first of these passages the solution from De Sensu 7 seems to be rejected because it cannot account for perceptual discrimination of two or more homogeneous special perceptibles, e.g. black and white. That solution is supplanted by another one in which Aristotle compares the discriminating capacity to the geometrical point. This analogy is closely examined and an interpretation of its application to the case of perceptual discrimination of homogeneous special perceptibles is proposed. This interpretation is then supported, if only tentatively, by an analysis of a notoriously difficult passage from De Anima III.7. It is concluded that Aristotle's explanation of simultaneous perception and perceptual discrimination of two or more homogeneous special perceptibles is rather unsatisfactory.
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