Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ryan Nichols

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276912

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 July 2020

Intentional Awareness

Intentional Awareness

(p.41) 2 Intentional Awareness
Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception

Ryan Nichols (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on the nature of conceptual awareness. Reid characterizes the type of conceptual awareness of interest to his theory of perception as a special subspecies of conception, what he calls apprehension. Apprehension is responsible for the presentation of mind-independent objects directly to the mind. Reid describes the conceptual state that apprehension produces as an ‘immanent act of the mind’. This is an intentional state because it necessarily takes objects. Apprehensions thus differ from other mental states, such as moods, which are not intentional.

Keywords:   Thomas Reid, conceptual awareness, theory of perception, apprehension, mental states

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .