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Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind$
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David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272457

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.001.0001

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Consciousness of Abstract Objects *

Consciousness of Abstract Objects *

(p.183) 8 Consciousness of Abstract Objects *
Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Richard Tieszen (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Edmund Husserl is one of only a few major philosophers in the last one hundred years or so who holds that it is possible to develop a philosophy of mind in which one can account for the consciousness of abstract objects or ideal objects. This chapter discusses Husserl's ideas in connection with the views of Kurt Gödel and Roger Penrose. It presents an argument that leads from Gödel's incompleteness theorems to recognition of the awareness of abstract or ideal objects. Husserl's view, based on his ideas about intentionality and the phenomenological reduction, shows us how to open up a space for a phenomenology of the consciousness of abstract mathematical objects.

Keywords:   Gödel, Penrose, Husserl, abstract objects, intentionality, incompleteness theorems, mathematical platonism, idealization

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