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Democratic DriftMajoritarian Modification and Democratic Anomie in the United Kingdom$
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Matthew Flinders

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199271597

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271597.001.0001

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V10. Central Bank Independence

V10. Central Bank Independence

Chapter:
(p.255) Chapter 14 V10. Central Bank Independence
Source:
Democratic Drift
Author(s):

Matthew Flinders (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271597.003.0014

Throughout the twentieth century the view was taken by consecutive governments that the United Kingdom's constitution was incompatible with the concept of central bank independence. New Labour departed from this position and instead sought to square the circle by granting independence but within the contours of the Westminster Model.

Keywords:   Central Bank, Bank of England, Monetary Policy, Westminster Model, operational independence, executive veto, anti‐majoritarian institutions

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