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Corporate Governance and Firm OrganizationMicrofoundations and Structural Forms$
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Anna Grandori

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199269761

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.001.0001

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Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures

Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures

Chapter:
(p.67) 3 Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures
Source:
Corporate Governance and Firm Organization
Author(s):

Anna Grandori (Contributor Webpage)

Giuseppe Soda

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0004

This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.

Keywords:   agency theory, multiple principals, governance mechanisms, human capital, preferences, Italian firms

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