The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from Diversity
The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from Diversity
By using a highly abstract evolutionary game model, this chapter investigates the mechanism of evolution of different organizational conventions as well as the roles of free trade, integration, experiments, emulation, and entrepreneurial foresight for exploring gains from organizational diversity. It focuses on an aspect of organization as a voluntary association of economic agents trying to overcome the bounds of their rationality, scope of action and competence, rather than as an ‘instrument’ for entrepreneurial maximizing behaviour. Two generic forms of organization as an information system are identified. The chapter concludes by discussing the relevance of the evolutionary game model for understanding actual organizational evolutionary processes in North America and Japan.
Keywords: evolutionary mechanisms, game models, rationality, North American firms, Japanese firms
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