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ThoughtsPapers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality$
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Stephen Yablo

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266463

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.001.0001

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Mental Causation

Mental Causation

Chapter:
(p.222) 8 Mental Causation
Source:
Thoughts
Author(s):

Stephen Yablo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.003.0008

This chapter begins with a discussion of the traditional paradigm of one-way necessitation — the relation of determinate to determinable. It then considers the question: What if mental phenomena are determinables of physical phenomena in something like the traditional sense? Then since a determinate cannot preempt its own determinable, mental events and properties lose nothing in causal relevance to their physical bases. If anything, it is the other way around. Overladen as they frequently are with physical details far beyond the effect's causal requirements, it is the physical phenomena which are liable to disqualification on grounds of superfluity.

Keywords:   dualism, necessitation, determinable, physical phenomena, superfluity, mental phenomena

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