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ThoughtsPapers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality$
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Stephen Yablo

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266463

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.001.0001

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Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda

Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda

Chapter:
(p.103) 4 Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda
Source:
Thoughts
Author(s):

Stephen Yablo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.003.0004

Despite the enormous amount of work on the metaphysical/conceptual distinction, the distinction remains not terribly well understood. One reason is that the conceptual side of the distinction did not receive, at Kripke's hands, the same sort of development as the metaphysical side. While many people have doubts about conceptual possibility, a number of other people are entirely gung ho about it, with some even treating it (and narrow content) as more, or anyway no less, fundamental than metaphysical possibility (and broad content). This chapter tries not to take sides between the skeptics and the believers, but considers how conceptual possibility should be handled — supposing it is going to be handled at all.

Keywords:   Kripke, Naming and Necessity, conceptual possibility, analycity, apriority, empiricism, rationalism

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