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Agency and ResponsibilityA Common-Sense Moral Psychology$
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Jeanette Kennett

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266302

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001

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Introduction: Moral Psychology and Common Sense

Introduction: Moral Psychology and Common Sense

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Introduction: Moral Psychology and Common Sense
Source:
Agency and Responsibility
Author(s):

Jeanette Kennett

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.003.0001

This chapter presents a defence of common sense in the area of moral psychology. It suggests that philosophers ignore common sense at their peril. Moral psychology deals with the folk-psychological categories of belief, desire, emotion, evaluation, and decision. If follows that these categories are informed by the accumulated wisdom about human motivation and human action which common sense offers. The chapter outlines the claims made by common sense about moral motivation, moral success, moral failure, and moral responsibility and indicates what about the claims have led philosophers to be sceptical of them.

Keywords:   common sense, moral success, moral failure, accumulated wisdom, moral psychology, moral motivation

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