Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
In Defense of Legal PositivismLaw Without Trimmings$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Matthew H. Kramer

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199264834

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264834.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 12 November 2019

Justice as Constancy

Justice as Constancy

Chapter:
(p.21) 2 Justice as Constancy
Source:
In Defense of Legal Positivism
Author(s):

MATTHEW H. KRAMER

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264834.003.0002

This chapter undertakes a critique of the account of formal justice propounded by David Lyons. On the one hand, the chapter agrees with Lyons that the mere status of norms as laws does not confer any degree of moral legitimacy on officials’ enforcement of those norms. On the other hand, the chapter departs from Lyons by accepting that the strict application of the law by officials does amount to formal justice. Precisely because the achievement of formal justice in the administration of law by officials is not perforce conducive (and is frequently inimical) to the substantive justice of their law-administering activities, the equation between formal justice and the strict effecutation of applicable legal mandates is fully consistent with the separability of law and morality.

Keywords:   formal justice, David Lyons, morality, law, legal positivism, procedural justice, administrative justice, justice

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .