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The Practice of PrincipleIn Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory$
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Jules Coleman

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199264124

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264124.001.0001

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(p.13) Lecture Two— Bilateralism
The Practice of Principle


Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that economic analysis is unsatisfactory as conceptual analysis. It defends a certain form of conceptual explanation of tort law, which takes the form of showing how a certain principle — the principle of corrective justice — is embodied in tort law. It also offers a variety of reasons for rejecting the economic analysis. It argues that there is a significant gap between the goals or functions that a social practice may happen to serve, and the goals, functions, and other features that constitute the nature of that practice and tell us what it is.

Keywords:   economic analysis, conceptual analysis, tort law, principle of corrective justice, corrective justice

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