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The Practice of PrincipleIn Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory$
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Jules Coleman

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199264124

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264124.001.0001

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Normativity and Naturalism

Normativity and Naturalism

Chapter:
(p.175) Lecture Twelve— Normativity and Naturalism
Source:
The Practice of Principle
Author(s):

JULES L. COLEMAN

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264124.003.0013

This chapter addresses the full range of arguments designed to show that the philosophical investigation of law and of the concepts that figure in it must be an activity of moral or political philosophy. The standard formulations of the debate between so-called descriptive and normative jurisprudence are considered misleading and unhelpful. The task of finding a satisfactory formulation of the dispute occupies much of the chapter; a good deal of the rest is devoted to resolving the dispute.

Keywords:   philosophical investigation, legal theory, moral philosophy, political philosophy, jurisprudence

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