Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Self-Knowing Agents$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Lucy O'Brien

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261482

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 17 July 2019

Perceptual Models of First‐Person Reference

Perceptual Models of First‐Person Reference

(p.29) 3 Perceptual Models of First‐Person Reference
Self-Knowing Agents

Lucy O'Brien (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines Evans's account of first-person reference and finds it unsatisfactory. It argues that to the extent that an account of first-person reference assumes that the referent of ‘I’ is fixed by perceptual information — which is the essential claim of a perceptual account — the account will be subject to the possibility of coherent and comprehending uses of ‘I’ surviving the absence or disturbance of such information. In order to block such a possibility, a tight conceptual dependence between our currently being able to refer to ourselves and our having available accurate perceptual information to identify the person we are would be needed.

Keywords:   external perceptual model, first-person reference, Evans, I

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .