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Self-Knowing Agents$
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Lucy O'Brien

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261482

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001

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Arguments for the No‐Reference View of ‘I’

Arguments for the No‐Reference View of ‘I’

(p.15) 2 Arguments for the No‐Reference View of ‘I’
Self-Knowing Agents

Lucy O'Brien (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents an extended discussion of Anscombe on the problem of first-person reference. It introduces and criticizes the internal perceptual model for first-person reference. It also introduces and undercuts the motivation behind Anscombe's sceptical and unacceptable view that ‘I’ does not refer.

Keywords:   Anscombe, first-person reference, internal perceptual model, guaranteed reference, I

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