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Self-Knowing Agents$
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Lucy O'Brien

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261482

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001

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Bodily Awareness and Self‐Knowledge

Bodily Awareness and Self‐Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.201) 11 Bodily Awareness and Self‐Knowledge
Source:
Self-Knowing Agents
Author(s):

Lucy O'Brien (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0011

This chapter discusses whether bodily awareness is rightly seen as a source of self-knowledge in the relevant sense of knowledge of ourselves as subjects. It argues that bodily awareness is only one more perceptual faculty, and that in so far as perceptual faculties rely upon a subject attaining knowledge of him or herself via some input, we cannot consider it as a primary source for self-knowledge in the way that we can count knowledge of oneself attained via one's output. Our knowledge of our actions through an agent's awareness, has been characterized as knowledge of oneself via one's output, independent of an incoming representation of the action carried out. As such, it constitutes a primary source for self-knowledge.

Keywords:   bodily awareness, self-knowledge, knowledge, perceptual faculty, self consciousness, self reference

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