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Perception and its Objects$
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Bill Brewer

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199260256

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001

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Indirect Realism

Indirect Realism

Chapter:
(p.33) 3 Indirect Realism
Source:
Perception and its Objects
Author(s):

Bill Brewer (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.003.0003

Locke's response to the Inconsistent Triad is to reject (II), the claim that physical objects are the direct objects of perception. This leads to his indirect realism on which perceptual experiences have mind-dependent direct objects but nevertheless may present mind-independent physical objects if these are the sufficiently resembling causes of experiences with the direct objects in question. As Berkeley contends, it is argued here that the required resemblance with mind-dependent direct objects is incompatible with the mind-independence of physical objects themselves. The indirect realist rejection of (II) is inconsistent with the pre-theoretic intuition that we are presented with mind-independent physical objects in perception in such a way as to provide us with at least a rough and provisional conception of what such objects are.

Keywords:   Locke, indirect realism, mind-dependence, resemblance, presentation

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