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Regulating Contracts$
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Hugh Collins

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199258017

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199258017.001.0001

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Formalism and Efficiency

Formalism and Efficiency

Chapter:
(p.174) 8 Formalism and Efficiency
Source:
Regulating Contracts
Author(s):

Hugh Collins

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199258017.003.0008

This chapter draws together the threads of the argument with respect to the question of what kind of regulation of contracts will best support markets. The argument challenges the conventional wisdom that a clear, formal set of rules defining the entitlements of parties to the contract best serves the interests of business. It is argued that the advantages of formalism in legal reasoning are normally overstated, and that calculability of legal entitlements requires rather more open textured roles and other techniques for contextualizing disputes.

Keywords:   formalism, contractual regulation, entitlements, common law reasoning, commercial arbitration, legal doctrine

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