Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Emotion and Peace of MindFrom Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation$

Richard Sorabji

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256600

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  Subscriber: null; date: 17 September 2019

The Emotions As Value Judgements In Chrysippus

The Emotions As Value Judgements In Chrysippus

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 The Emotions As Value Judgements In Chrysippus
Source:
Emotion and Peace of Mind
Author(s):

Richard Sorabji (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords

Chrysippus (Stoic, 3rd century BCE) gives an intellectualist account of emotions: they are value judgements stating that the situation is good or bad, and that it is appropriate to react accordingly. In appetite and fear, pursuit and avoidance, in pleasure and distress, a felt expansion or sinking (contraction) of soul are judged appropriate. All other emotions fall under these four generic emotions. Shocks to soul (e.g., expansion and sinking) and to body are not part of the emotion, but only necessary accompaniments. The judgements are not involuntary appearances, but voluntary assents to how things appear. Most should be reconsidered, as mistaken, assent withheld, and the emotion thus eradicated. This leaves motivation intact, since we can keep both good emotions which involve no mistake (eupatheiai), and unemotional judgements (eklogai) about what is natural and preferable, though it falls short of being good. Preferable things can be desired ‘with reservation’.

Keywords:   emotion, judgement, good, contraction, Eupatheiai, Eklogai, reservation, eradicate, generic emotions

The Four Generic Emotions As Value Judgements

In the century after Aristotle the Stoics selected four emotions as the most generic ones under which all other emotions could be arranged as species. The four are distress (lupē, aegritudo), pleasure (hēdonē, laetitia), fear (phobos, metus), and appetite (epithumia, libido, appetitus, cupiditas).1 These four are arrived at by taking a pair of emotions directed to the present and a pair directed to the future, one of each pair involving apparent goods, one apparent evils.2 Highly similar divisions still appeal nowadays, although one modern author expands his list by including emotions directed to the past,3 while another substitutes the criterion of uncertainty for that of futurity.4 Clearly, the Stoic classification differs from that of other schools. We have seen Aristotle, for example, treating fear as a species of distress, not co‐ordinate with it.

The Stoics make a further exceedingly bold claim. Every emotion involves two distinctive value judgements. One is that there is good or bad (benefit or harm) at hand, the other that it is appropriate to react.5 Distress is the judgement that there is bad at hand and that it (p.30) is appropriate to feel a sinking. Pleasure is the judgement that there is good at hand and that it is appropriate to feel an expansion. Fear is the judgement that there is bad at hand and that it is appropriate to avoid it. Appetite is the judgement that there is good at hand and that it is appropriate to reach for it. The two judgements can often be expressed as one complex judgement, but for some purposes, we shall see, it is important that they can be separated.

The subspecies of emotion are sometimes, though not always,6 distinguished by the particular type of good or bad in question. Pity is distress at bad befalling another, anger appetite for the supposed good of revenge. The four most generic emotions, distress, pleasure, fear, and appetite, are defined in terms of generic good or bad only, not of particular kinds.

When I say that the good or bad is judged to be at hand, the ‘at hand’ is short for the Stoic requirement that it is judged to be present or future. As to why the Stoics do not think it enough that the good or bad should be judged wholly past, I shall return to this question in Chapter 9.

‘Appropriate’ in ‘appropriate to react’ is a wide term, corresponding to the Greek kathēkei and a number of gerundive endings, pheukton (paired in the emended text with orekton), anupomonēton, akarterēton. The Latin renderings are oportere, rectum esse, aequum esse, ad officium pertinere, officium, debitum, ius, and intolerabile.7 It is by no means confined to judgements made on moral grounds, although it includes, for example, the case in which mourners come to think they have a moral duty to react.8

The judgement that it is appropriate to react covers two very different types of reaction.9 In pleasure and distress, the reaction (p.31) approved is internal, present, and involuntary. It is an internal contraction (sustolē, meiōsis, tapeinōsis, Latin demitti, contrahi), or expansion (eparsis, diakhusis, Latin profusa).10 What contracts or expands is said to be the mind (animus),11 and the mind is a physical spirit for the Stoic materialists. There is no agreement at present about the psychological character of the Stoic contraction and expansion.12 But I shall argue below that the contraction is a felt sinking, is felt as being located in the heart, and finally is felt as being bad, while an expansion is a lift felt as being good.

In fear and appetite, by contrast, the approved reactions are behavioural, voluntary, and directed to the future. There is an opinion (doxa) that the bad thing is to be avoided (pheukton) and is not to be tolerated (intolerabile, anupomonēton, akarterēton), or (in the text adopted by Meineke and Wachsmuth) that the good thing is to be reached for (orekton), and that its immediate presence would be of use (ex usu). In anger, for example, the idea is that it is appropriate for me to be avenged (oporteat me vindicari), or for him to be punished (oporteat hunc poenas dare).13 I need not think, in such a case, that I am myself in a position to carry out the reaction, or even that anyone else is. It is merely that punishment would be right.

Although anger is classed as an appetite looking forward to revenge, the idea of vengeance imports a reference to a present evil, which makes anger akin to grief. The Stoics help us to see how easily anger and grief can slide one into the other.

Inner reactions and outer (behavioural) reactions can be causally connected because, although fear and appetite take the lead (proēgeisthai), pleasure and distress follow on them (epigignesthai), according to whether we do or do not get what we desired or feared.14

The description of the two types of reaction is not always as clear‐cut as it is in the main texts cited. For example, it is sometimes not (p.32) made clear that the approved reaction in distress is a contraction.15 But this unclarity about the precise reaction is natural, for if one thinks it right to experience an inner contraction, one may well think it right to indulge in the other phenomena of distress as well.

The Need For a Second Judgement

Chrysippus needed to insist on the second ‘appropriate to react’ judgement for at least four reasons. First he thought it was the main thing that needed to be attacked in consoling the distressed. In this he differed from his predecessor Cleanthes, who simply mounted a blanket attack on the first judgement, saying that (almost) nothing was good or bad, since it was all indifferent. As Cicero complains, that was useless for therapy, since it could only be taken in by those who were already sages, and sages need no therapy.16

The second judgement is also needed in order to deal with the case of Alcibiades being exposed by Socrates as lacking in virtue. If someone like Alcibiades has not yet attained virtue, his situation is genuinely bad, so how can he be advised not to feel distress? As Stephen White has shown, Chrysippus' reply can easily be inferred: although he would be right to judge his situation bad, he would be wrong if, like Alcibiades, he added the second judgement, that inner sinkings would be an appropriate reaction.17 Presumably the most appropriate reaction would be a determination to improve. But why should not a contraction or sinking also be appropriate? I think the answer is that it can indeed be appropriate to the novice's circumstances, if it acts as a spur to improvement. And the Stoics in fact allow the novice, who is merely making progress, to indulge in such reactions. The mistake, from the Stoic point of view, is to suppose that contraction or sinking is ever appropriate absolutely. Cicero gives a reason why it is not: it detracts from constancy, gravity, and composure.18 It must, then, remove the novice still further from being a sage. I would add something closer to the novice's point of view: I have conjectured that a sinking must be felt as bad (or good), (p.33) or there would be no question of its being judged appropriate to bad (or good) circumstances. Even the novice, then, can recognize a sinking as something it would ideally be better not to have. I shall return to this subject below when I ask why the Stoics allow the sage analogues of other emotions, but not of distress.

The third reason why the ‘appropriate to react’ judgement is needed is that emotion, we shall see below, involves a particular type of judgement, namely an impulse. Now an impulse is stirred not by the first appearance that there is good or bad at hand, but only by the second appearance of how it is appropriate (kathēkon) to react:

They say that what stirs impulse (hormē) is nothing other than a motivating (hormētikē) appearance of what is of itself appropriate (kathēkontos).19

The fourth reason why Chrysippus needs to postulate a second judgement will emerge in Chapter 5 in connection with emotions fading despite the retention of the first judgement, that the present situation is bad. As interpreted below, Chrysippus seeks to solve this by saying that the second judgement fades, the judgement that contraction is appropriate.20

Is the Good, Bad and Appropriate Actual Or Possible?

One can feel horror at what might have happened, or might have been going to happen, and at what might yet occur. So the good and bad that one makes judgements about can be a merely possible good and bad. In Chapter 5 I shall maintain that one can also feel emotion in relation to good and bad in fiction and historical narratives, but I believe Seneca tries to disallow this.

Is the judgement that pursuit or avoidance is appropriate open to similar qualification? It must be in at least two cases. One is that in which pursuit or avoidance is impossible. Then at most we could judge that it would be appropriate if it were possible. The other case is that in which the good or bad situation is merely one that might have occurred. Then pursuit or avoidance is otiose, although it was once, or could have been, appropriate.

Things are different when the judgement concerns the appropriateness of our present inner expansions or contractions. We may well (p.34) consider those actually appropriate, even in relation to what merely might have occurred. A case in which a person could only judge that reaction would be appropriate is that in which he lacks the appropriate expansion or contraction. But below I shall offer some reason to doubt whether such a person would be thought by Chrysippus to be in a state of pleasure or distress.

Judgements, Not Contractions and Expansions

The definitions of the four generic emotions as value judgements were not the only ones that the early Stoics tried out. Many of our sources give us an alternative set of definitions,21 and we are told that Chrysippus wrote out both.22 We are also told that he wrote out (gegrammenoi) definitions offered orally (eirēmenoi) by the founder Zeno.23 In some of the alternative definitions distress is an irrational contraction, pleasure an irrational expansion, appetite an irrational desire (literally, ‘reaching’: orexis, appetitio), and fear an irrational disinclination (literally, ‘leaning away’: ekklisis, declinatio). One source tells us that Chrysippus thought the emotions actually were the judgements which we have been discussing, whereas Zeno and many other Stoics thought the emotions occurred on the occasion of (epi) judgements, but (in the case of distress and pleasure at least) actually were the contractions and expansions.24

This testimony is too explicit to ignore. In contrast with Chrysippus' account of emotions as judgements, Zeno seems to concentrate on various kinds of movement, the movements being physical movements, since the soul consists of physical pneuma. Not only are the contractions and expansions movements, but so are the reachings and leanings away. One of Zeno's general definitions of emotion says that it is a movement of the soul.25 It is Zeno too who introduces the idea to be discussed below that every emotion is a fluttering (ptoia).26

The claim that Zeno did not identify emotions with judgements is not impugned by the evidence that he referred to judgements in (p.35) his definitions of distress and pleasure.27 For he evidently defined them as being contractions and expansions on the occasion of (fresh) judgements of evil and good. Only once, by a form of shorthand, does he define distress as a belief, rather than the result of belief.28 This causal pattern of definition is preserved (without reference to Zeno and with some non‐Zenonian additions) by Stobaeus, who presents the four generic emotions as being a contraction, expansion, reaching, or leaning away, but offers the judgements as the cause (aition).29 The same pattern is preserved by Diogenes Laertius for one of the four definitions, namely that of pleasure as irrational expansion upon (epi) the presence of something believed to be choiceworthy.30 I think, then, that Zeno, in identifying the four generic emotions with contractions, expansions, and perhaps reachings and leanings away, still brought in judgements as their cause. What Chrysippus did was to turn the cause (the judgement) into the emotion itself.

I believe that turning the judgement into the emotion itself was more than a merely verbal change, and was to be important for later Stoic developments. The contrary has been argued. But Chrysippus' denial that emotions are contractions and expansions became important when later Stoics introduced contractions preceding, as well as accompanying, emotion, to serve as a pre‐emotional state. They insisted most strongly that these pre‐judgemental contractions were not yet the emotion. This insistence becomes virtually unintelligible if the emotion is itself a contraction. How can it then differ significantly from the contraction which is supposed to precede it? Indeed, it has been denied by ancient and modern commentators that there is any difference.31 But this is to go against the insistence on the distinction in the texts. Furthermore, it prevents us understanding the methods for controlling emotion in the later Stoics, because the claim that the preliminary contractions were not yet the emotion was supposed to help you stop the emotion itself from ever forming, and (p.36) to keep control in a tight situation. This will be further explained in Chapter 11.

A rearguard action might be attempted: could not Zeno have anticipated Chrysippus' view that emotions are judgements? For suppose the contractions and expansions with which he identifies certain emotions are thought by him to be impulses, and impulses to be judgements. But the links in this chain are weak. We have already seen, and the evidence will be reinforced later, that for Zeno impulse and emotion are not identical with, but merely occur on the occasion of (epi), judgements. And as for contractions and expansions, I have argued that at least Zeno's successors do not regard them as impulses.

Contractions and Expansions As Necessary Concomitants, Though Not Components, Of Distress and Pleasure

When Chrysippus rejects the view that distress and pleasure are contraction and expansion, he need not be denying that they are often so accompanied, and perhaps always so. There is some evidence on this. Chrysippus said that when the opinion of evil is fresh, it both contracts (sustellei) the soul and produces distress, but after a time it does not entirely, or so much, contract it.32 The distress too, we learn, abates (aniesthai), as well as the contraction.33 Already it appears that distress and contraction are invariable concomitants. The contraction may even be necessary to the distress, in spite of not being a component. That is the most obvious interpretation of Chrysippus explaining the abatement of distress initially by reference to the contraction abating.34 To avoid concluding that contraction was necessary to the distress, we should need to resort to the more complex interpretation that it was necessary to the distress being particularly noticeable. But it is easier to suppose that contraction, though not a component, is for Chrysippus a necessary concomitant.

Cicero's Summary

It will be useful to translate Cicero's account of the four definitions of emotions as judgements, after issuing four warnings. First, when Cicero uses the verb videatur (‘be seen as’), we should take him to be referring not to a mere appearance, but to a full‐blown judgement. (p.37) (The distinction will be clarified shortly.) Secondly, the word ‘fresh’ (recens) is included in the definition for a reason that will be fully investigated only in Chapter 7. But roughly speaking, the word makes an important acknowledgement, that distress and pleasure can abate over time, even though the original value judgements are still in place. Thus, the judgements on this view need to be fresh, or at least refreshed, if there is to be emotion. Thirdly, pleasure ought to be defined in terms of judging it appropriate that one's soul should expand. When Cicero instead speaks of judging it appropriate to be carried away (efferri), he is borrowing a term which Seneca associates with a later stage of emotion. In Latin it is easy to confuse the two stages of expansion and of being carried away, because the past participle of efferri (‘to be carried away’) in Latin is borrowed from another root: it is elātum, originally tlātum from tollo ‘to raise’. Latin writers use the cognate elātio (our ‘elation’) to render the Greek word eparsis (rising), which is applied by the Stoics to the expansion of the soul as well as using it for carrying away. In fact, the two concepts should have been distinguished. Finally, Cicero's wording tends to obscure the judgement of appropriateness in connection with the two behavioural reactions involved in appetite and fear. However, his talk of judging something intolerable in fear corresponds to gerundives in the Greek texts: anupomonēton, akarterēton (not to be endured), and pheukton (to be fled).35 And his talk of judging something useful in appetite is a weak version of Seneca's talk of judging it appropriate (oportere) to be avenged and of the gerundive orekton (‘to be reached for’) in the emended Greek text of Stobaeus.36

So distress is a fresh judgement (opinio) of present evil, in which it is seen as appropriate for the mind to be lowered and contracted. Pleasure is a fresh judgement of present good in which it is seen as appropriate to be carried away. Fear is a judgement of impending evil which is seen as being intolerable. Appetite is a judgement of good to come such as it would be useful to have present now and here.37

Contractions and Expansions

To complete the clarification of these four definitions and of the alternative set of four, I should finish saying what I believe the contractions and expansions to be. So far I have said that they are (p.38) physical contractions and expansions of the mind, which was itself regarded as physical by the Stoics. But what is their psychological character? They cannot be impulses, at least in the late Stoics who contrast initial contractions and expansions with emotional impulse. And there is no sign that they are impulses in Chrysippus. I shall argue that their psychological character is that they are sensed. The crucial evidence for their physical and psychological character has, I think, been commonly overlooked, perhaps because it comes from passages not included in von Arnim's collection of Stoic fragments. In PHP books 2–3 Galen quotes Chrysippus on a wide range of movements of the mind involved in emotion.38 Contractions are not explicitly mentioned, but ‘bites’ are, and bites seem to be sharp little contractions. They are often associated with contractions or little contractions (contractiunculae),39 and like contractions are associated with distress.40 In addition, as we shall see, a sinking of the mind is connected with fear and outward rushes with anger.

Chrysippus' aim is to show that the command centre of the soul is located in the heart.41 His argument is that in emotion we actually feel the bites, sinkings, and other physical movements as located there. Bites are explicitly mentioned when Galen complains of Chrysippus' cardiocentric argument:

You will find that the same holds with the argument from the bite (dēxis) in cases of distress. For the bite is clearly (enargōs) in the mouth of the stomach, but they refer it to the heart.42

The sinking of the soul towards the heart is cited by Chrysippus in the following passage:

For the palpitation (palsis) of the heart in fear is evident (ekphanēs) and the running together (sundromē) of the whole soul to this place. These [movements] occur not as a mere after‐effect, as when one part has a natural sympathy with others. It is in virtue of people sinking (sunizanousin) into themselves and collecting themselves (sunagomenoi) towards this as being (p.39) the command centre and at the heart as being for them the guardian of the command centre.43

The reference to our feeling the location of the movement has so far been in terms of the location being evident (ekphanēs) or clear (enargōs). But in two passages Chrysippus uses a more explicit verb for self‐awareness, sunaisthanesthai:

Most people seem to me to be brought to this common view, as if they were conscious (sunaisthanomenoi) of emotions (pathē) in the mind happening around their thorax and especially where the heart is arranged. This happens, for example, especially in cases of distress, fear, and anger, and most of all rage. For impressions are produced in us as if something were being vaporized from out of the heart and were being pushed out to certain parts and blowing into the face and hands.44

Why does Chrysippus say merely that it is as if (hōsanei) people were conscious? Galen, perfectly fairly in my view, makes a lot of this qualification, because he wants to show how far Chrysippus has to go, to argue from the sensed movements being in the region of the heart, to the emotions being there, to the mind being there, and finally to the command centre of the mind being there and not just (as Plato would allow) that part of the mind that is concerned with anger. Chrysippus has himself been scrupulous in saying that it is only as if people were conscious of the emotions there, because what they are directly conscious of there is the movements which in Chrysippus' view, as opposed to Zeno's, are not identical with the emotions themselves. In the next quotation from Chrysippus it is not the emotion, but the accompanying pain (algēdōn), of which people are said to be conscious, so no ‘as if’ qualification is required:45

For just as when our foot or head hurts the pain occurs in those places, so too we are conscious (sunaisthanometha) in a case of distress (lupē) of pain (algēdōn) occurring in the thorax.46

These passages concern phenomena which the Stoics connect closely with contractions. From them I conclude that the physical (p.40) contractions of the mind are felt, and felt as being in the heart, according to Chrysippus. But there is one more question to be settled: how can the contractions be thought appropriate to one's situation, as his definitions require, if they are felt as merely neutral sensations?47 Two answers seem possible. The sensations are thought appropriate either because they have been associated with unpleasant things in the past, or because they themselves feel unpleasant. The second option fits with something that is said by Justin Gosling and Christopher Taylor on independent grounds, when they are talking about pleasant and unpleasant sensations in the Stoics more generally.48 Such sensations, even if the word ‘pleasure’ is sometimes used of them,49 must be distinct from pleasure and distress in the strict sense, since the sensations do not require the assent of the mind, whereas, according to the Stoics, pleasure and distress do. In order to distinguish them, Gosling and Taylor suggest that pleasant and unpleasant sensations for the Stoics consist in the appearance as good or bad of bodily functions, an appearance which does not require the mind's assent.

It will be noticed that it is not only pleasure and distress which involve some kind of contraction or expansion. Fear involves an internal sinking, or massing of the mind at the centre (I suggest reading sunathroiseis instead of sunthroēseis in the relevant passage of Plutarch).50 And anger, which is a type of appetite, involves a felt blowing as if of vapour out of the heart.51

The Stoic appeal to contraction and expansion seems to me entirely realistic, provided we reinterpret it in physiological terms, as Galen actually does, followed by Plotinus and by Gregory of Nyssa.52 (p.41) Emotions often involve, not indeed movements of a physical soul, but physiological movements which are felt as sinking or expansive sensations, or as bites. Moreover, we do often judge them to be highly appropriate responses to our situation.

Appearance Or Belief?

The belief (doxa, Latin opinio) or judgement (krisis, Latin iudicium) involved in emotion is distinguished by the Stoics from mere appearance (phantasia, Latin species, visum, visio) by the idea that belief or judgement involves an additional mental operation. It involves assenting (sunkatathesis, Latin adsensus, consensio, consensus) with the mind or reason to the appearance.53 Strictly speaking, assent is given to propositions,54 and hence to the proposition contained in the appearance. Seneca insists that the mere appearance of injustice (species iniuriae)55 does not amount to anger without an assent of the mind (adsensus mentis),56 by which the appearance is approved (adprobare).57 The mind must agree that there really is an injustice.

Plato had treated appearance (phantasia) as merely one kind of belief (doxa)—belief combined with sense perception.58 It was Aristotle who first insisted that appearance and belief were different things, although he distinguished them by something other than the Stoic assent.59

Whether emotions require belief or appearance remained controversial. Aristotle had interchanged the terms freely in his account of human emotions in the context of the law courts, where it made no difference.60 But we shall see in Chapter 9 that one Aristotelian, Aspasius, rebukes another, Andronicus, for taking what was in fact the Stoic view, that actual belief is required.61 I shall argue in Chapter 8 that, on different grounds again, not only Aspasius but also the Stoic Posidonius and the Middle Platonist treatise Didaskalikos allow emotions to occur without judgement. This too may often have been (p.42) on the basis of mere appearance. In those chapters I shall argue that Posidonius is right: there are examples of emotion in which assent is not given.

None the less, we may overestimate how common those examples are if we do not take into account the Stoic training in evaluating appearances and withholding assent. Untrained people in an emotional state, the Stoics would say, are likely to have assented to appearances so automatically as not to recognize assent as a distinct operation. It is the Stoic training that makes one conscious of the distinction between appearance and assent. If one sees a person who is really evaluating appearance, there will not be the same temptation to suppose that they are already indulging in emotion. The idea that appearance is sufficient for emotion is partly due to the failure to notice that, in the absence of training, assent will already have taken place without being noticed. We must wait for Posidonius' objections to see why there really are cases in which appearance without assent is sufficient for emotion.

Mind Or Will?

Seneca requires assent of the mind for the first of the two judgements involved in anger, that there has been an injustice. But when he comes to the second judgement, that it is appropriate to react, he speaks instead of the will (voluntas). There is an act of will to the effect that it is appropriate for me to be revenged since I have been harmed, or that it is appropriate for him to be punished since he has committed a crime.62 The switch to talking of the will is, no doubt, because the proposition has to do with action. But Seneca writes as if there was not a radical difference between assent and will. Why not?

The first thing to notice is that the term ‘will’(voluntas) is not here used in its technical Stoic sense of a reasonable desire, but is used of an unreasonable desire. It seems to stand for the Stoics' main general term for desire, namely hormē, Latin impetus. The standard translation is ‘impulse’, quaintly since there need be nothing impulsive about it. De Lacy prefers ‘conation’, and ‘desire’ would also have been better, but I shall not tamper with the convention. The important point for the present is that impulse is at least sometimes equated (p.43) with assent (sunkatathesis).63 In other words, it is just another case of assent on the part of reason, but assent to an appearance about how it is appropriate (kathēkon) to act. That it is assent to an appearance about how it is appropriate to act we learn from a revealing passage which says that what stirs impulse is a motivating appearance (hormētikē phantasia) of what is appropriate (kathēkontos).64 This view of will and impulse, as assent to an appearance of how it is appropriate to act, explains a number of things. First, it explains Seneca speaking in our passage65 as if there was no significant difference between an act of will (voluntas) and the acts of assent by the mind which he had been discussing just before. Secondly, it explains how Chrysippus can have said that impulse in humans is their reason (logos), but their reason ordering them to act (logos prostaktikos tou poiein).66 Chrysippus, I shall argue in Chapter 3, may have been correcting Zeno, for Zeno held impulse to be caused by, not identical with, judgements of reason.

It is hard for us to believe Chrysippus' view. If you merely judge an action appropriate in some way (it would serve him right), it does not follow that you desire it at all. If you judge it appropriate, all things considered, it may be only under some descriptions that you want it (the medicine is horrible, but I want what will make me better). Conversely, if you desire something, e.g. an illicit action, you may think it would be, for example, exciting, but it does not follow that you think it in any way appropriate. Further, even in so far as judgements of appropriateness are correlated with desires, it does not follow that they are identical with them.

The sharp divide between desire and reason that we feel strongly today was something that Aristotle believed he had to insist on against Plato. The Platonists had separated from each other will (boulēsis), anger (thumos), and appetite (epithumia), assigning the first to the rational part of the soul (logistikon) and the others to the non‐rational. But in fact, according to Aristotle, the capacity for desire (to orektikon) should be recognized as having as much claim to be a distinct part in its own right as the rational part or any other. And its distinctness will be essential for explaining voluntary movement.67 (p.44) What Chrysippus' unitary psychology is doing in effect is blurring Aristotle's sharp distinction. There is a unitary faculty of reason, and in will it simply gives its assent to a particular type of proposition. In Chapter 6 we shall see that the Stoic Posidonius once again resists the unitary character of this account.

Chrysippus' unitary account also explains how emotion can on the one hand be equated with judgements in which assent is given, and on the other be defined as an impulse. Emotion is repeatedly defined as an excessive impulse (pleonazousa hormē).68 It is now clear that an impulse is simply an assent of reason to another kind of proposition.

I cannot agree with Pohlenz's view that Seneca changed all this, and that for him the will ‘is not a matter of the intellect’, although this view has been the dominant one.69 No such consequence follows from Seneca's contrasting the will (voluntas) to return a benefit with a rather different piece of knowledge, viz. how to return it.70 Nor does it follow when, talking of unreflective willing (velle), he says that no one knows how it begins, certainly not from deliberation (consilium).71 In Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1 the term ‘will’, in the broad sense of impulse, most certainly is interchanged with the term ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’. I shall explain in Chapter 21 why I believe the Stoics did not formulate a full‐blooded concept of will.

Impulse Not Sufficient For Action

I take it that the impulse in emotion does not guarantee corresponding action. But since this goes against what I believe to be the standard view, that impulse is sufficient for action,72 I had better explain. I would find it surprising if the Stoics thought impulse guaranteed action. When I have the impulse to take revenge, the time may not be ripe, it may never be ripe, or when it is, the impulse may have changed. There is a particular reason why the impulse involved in emotion is unlikely to guarantee action. For in a passage already (p.45) mentioned73 we are told that, for the Stoics, emotion involves an oscillation between two impulses, assents or judgements, the emotional impulse and one's better judgement. It is presumably not possible for both to be acted on. A passage has been cited on the other side in which Cicero, speaking of the Stoics, says that since (quoniam) impulse follows acts of assent, action follows on assent.74 But I do not think Cicero's purposes require that impulse should guarantee action, only that it typically produces it.

Emotions As Voluntary Because Eradicable

The Stoics not only talk of will, but also, relatedly, represent the emotions as voluntary,75 though for quite different reasons from those of Sartre in modern times.76 Seneca introduces his analysis of anger by saying that its whole point is to show whether anger is controllable, and it will be controllable, on his view, only if it is a judgement dependent on assent and will.77 Seneca's analysis of the stages of development in anger helps to show how they can be subjected to voluntary control. The initial appearance and the first movements or shocks do not have to lead on to emotion precisely because emotion requires acts of assent and will. It has been well pointed out that Latin is quite different from Greek in displaying an etymological connection between the words for will (voluntas) and for voluntariness (voluntarius).78 In Greek the corresponding words, boulēsis and hekōn/ hekousion, have no connection.

The voluntariness is based on the idea that one is free to question appearances and withhold assent from them. If you do not bother to do so, that is your own fault. If you do, then there are many therapeutic techniques to help you cast doubt on appearances. I shall illustrate and discuss the effectiveness of these techniques in Chapters 11–12 and 15–16. But arguments for voluntariness were also provided. Emotions are due not to nature, but to our own judgement,79 (p.46) which on the Stoic view involves voluntary assent. Examples reveal that emotions can be inhibited, or self‐induced.80 Time for reflection enables us to halt them.81

It is necessary for those who claim to be able to attain freedom from emotion to treat the emotions as in some sense voluntary. Accordingly, this happens not only with the Stoics, but with the Pyrrhonian sceptics, who also aspire to freedom from emotion (apathēs en tois doxastois).82 I shall discuss further in Chapter 14 how they contrast the sensations of pain, which the sceptic cannot avoid, with the emotions, for which one must be held responsible (aitiateon).83

Other schools reject the claim of voluntariness. The Aristotelians84 and Epicureans85 think the emotions unavoidable, although I shall suggest in Chapter 14 that the difference between Chrysippus and Philodemus the Epicurean on this point may be little more than verbal, since Philodemus believes that a kind of anger is attainable which the Stoics would consider freedom from anger. It has also been argued that which particular emotions you have is up to you, on the Epicurean view, because it is up to you which of the innumerable incoming images you select for focusing upon.86 The Middle Platonist Didaskalikos sides against Chrysippus and denies that emotions are ‘up to us’. The evidence it cites is merely that they often (pollakis) occur despite our reluctance and resistance (akousi, antiteinousin).87 But the conclusion is the more far‐reaching one, that they are in general not up to us.

The claim of voluntariness has been described as bizarre,88 and in the light of Freudian psychology it may seem especially so. But I hope that when we consider the ancient therapeutic techniques it will be seen to have an element of truth on its side.

(p.47) Deciding To Believe

The belief in voluntariness is opposed to an idea in modern philosophy that we cannot decide to believe anything.89 In effect, the Stoics are disagreeing, although the terminology is not theirs. We do decide to believe that there is good or bad at hand and that it is appropriate to react. The Stoics do not put this in terms of the will, except in contexts where the belief happens to be concerned in the relevant way with action. But we shall see in Chapter 21 that when Augustine gives his view, he makes the assent to appearance that is involved in belief to be an act of the will in every case.90 In this he is followed by Descartes, who uses the idea in order to argue that erroneous beliefs are our own fault: we have failed to use the free will we have, in order to withhold assent.91

Good Feelings: Eupatheiai

There is a final task for this chapter. To see what pathē, emotions, are for the Stoics, and eventually to see what Stoic freedom from emotion is, we must understand what is not counted as emotion. In the rest of this chapter I shall consider attitudes which the Stoics treat as acceptable. First and foremost are the good states of feeling (eupatheiai) which only the sage has. Although these states are not classed as pathē, a proportion of them would be counted by us as emotions, and so they constitute exceptions to the claim which I shall explain in Chapters 13 and 14, that the Stoics reject emotions and urge their eradication. But I believe these exceptions are few, first because the two fullest Stoic lists of eupatheiai, which very nearly agree with each other, recognize only a very few types, and secondly, because only a sage would have eupatheiai, and it is unclear whether the Stoics believe that anyone has yet attained to sagehood. It is to a large extent an ideal.

There are three kinds of eupatheia:joy (khara), will in the strict sense (boulēsis), and caution (eulabeia). The Latin word for will (voluntas) is used in a much looser sense when it is applied to the impulse (p.48) involved in the non‐sage's emotion. The fullest list of species of eupatheia reads:92

Four species of will (boulēsis)

Good will (eunoia) is wishing (boulēsis) good things to another for his sake.

Kindness (eumeneia) is lasting eunoia.

Welcoming (aspasmos) is uninterrupted eunoia.

Love (agapēsis) . . .93

Three species of joy (kharā)

Delight (terpsis) is a fitting joy at one's advantages (ōpheleiai).

Gladness (euphrosunē) is joy at the deeds of the temperate.

Cheerfulness (euthumia) is joy at the conduct of the universe and at its leaving nothing to be desired (anepizētēsia; or at enquiry into it—epizētēsia or similar, in Grosseteste's Greek).

Two species of caution (eulabeia)

Modesty (aidōs) is caution about due blame.

Piety (hagneia) is caution about sins towards the gods.

Joy is most obviously an emotion, caution not obviously so. What distinguishes joy from the emotion of pleasure, which is condemned, is presumably not the judgements involved. For in feeling joy, wise people evidently judge themselves to be in the presence of good things (the advantages of wisdom, the deeds of the temperate, the conduct of the universe). And since they are said to expand,94 they presumably judge that expansion is appropriate. The judgements have the same structure, but the stated difference is that the expansion is reasonable (eulogos). Reasonableness (eulogon) enters the definition of all three kinds of eupatheia. Joy is a reasonable expansion, will is a reasonable desire (orexis), in other words a reasonable impulse or assent, and caution a reasonable disinclination (ekklisis, Latin declinatio).

In Chrysippus' view, I think a still more basic difference will have been that the judgements are true, whereas, for reasons I shall explain in Chapter 12, the judgements involved in emotion are thought to (p.49) be false. It is a further difference that the judgements will also be rational in the sense of avoiding the kind of disobedience to reason which will be discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, since eupatheiai are confined to the sage, the requirement of reasonableness is likely also to involve a further background of understanding which makes the judgement rational and stable. And that in turn may help to explain Cicero's rendering eupatheiai in Latin as constantiae, and calling them constant and peaceful states (placide atque constanter).95 Seneca confirms that joy does not cease or turn into its opposite,96 although there are rival reports that joy is not permanent, nor the property of all sages at all times.97

Despite these differences of reasonableness and truth, Plutarch repeats an old complaint that caution is merely the emotion of fear, and caution about blameworthiness (aideisthai) merely a species of fear, viz. shame (aiskhunesthai). He adds that instinctive inclination (prothumia), which I shall treat separately because it is not a eupatheia, is no different from the emotion of appetite (epithumia).98 It is true that some at least of the eupatheiai are what we would call emotions, but Chrysippus is entitled to treat them separately on the grounds of reasonableness and truth.

What is less clear is why only the sage should be able to make the relevant reasonable and true judgements.99 The requirement of reasonableness (eulogon) is said to fall short of the requirement of knowledge (katalēpsis),100 so it does not explain the restriction to sages. But the explanation may lie in the non‐sage lacking the information needed for recognizing what conduct to avoid, or what to rejoice at in the deeds of God, or of other humans. These failures of information are in turn likely to rob the non‐sage of the constancy that marks the sage. Even the non‐sage's desire for good character lacks the stability which would be supplied by a sufficient background of information and rational understanding.

I have been presenting the types of eupatheia as few and the instances as rare. There is also an extra quite deliberate omission from the list, since there is no eupathic analogue of the emotion of distress.101 But why, it may be asked, would not the sage be absolutely (p.50) right to feel distress at bad character in others? The Stoic answer has already been given in the earlier discussion of why Alcibiades, the non‐sage, is wrong to feel distress at bad character in himself. Contraction, although the sage may feel it as a first movement,102 cannot be judged by him appropriate, not only because it is unpleasant, but because it detracts, to the extent it occurs, from his serenity.103 Perhaps the sage is also fortified by being able to see how bad character in others fits into the overall pattern of goodness.

There is a further restriction on the range of eupatheiai in that the eupatheia of will in the strict sense seems to be very narrow, because the four species listed cover willing things for others, not for oneself. One modern interpretation sought to expand the category by treating welcoming as a welcoming of what happens, rather than of people. But it was admitted that it should then have been classified as a kind of joy.104 Will may be a little wider, in so far as it is said to include hairesis, which on one interpretation is the sage's calculated selection of indifferents as an example of genuinely good action.105 Even so, it will be confined to the sage.

There may have been some small compensating expansions in the range of eupatheiai and the Stoics may themselves have added to the list. In Chapter 18 I shall consider their endorsement of Platonic homosexual love. This too is not a pathos, as I shall explain.

Non‐Stoics also made their preferred additions. Plotinus, for example, adds the state of mystical love.106 But he could have taken this directly from Plato, who uses the verb eupathein and the noun eupatheia.107 Proclus and Damascius call the pleasures of intellect a eupatheia108 and Philo of Alexandria, without speaking of eupatheia, (p.51) calls Moses' frank speaking to God a case not of tolma, audacity, but of eutolmia, good mettle.109 Philo adds a mistaken entry to the list: finding no eupatheia corresponding to distress, he inserts bites and contractions, presumably because these, like eupatheiai, are not classified as emotions.110 But this is a mistake and whatever the additions, the list of eupatheiai remains small.

Eupatheia may play a role in another context, because the Stoics say that all wise people benefit (ōphelein) each other, even if they do not know each other at all.111 This may seem surprising, for they do not depend on each other for their good character. One answer may be that they gain the eupatheia of joy from the thought of good character in others. This would be in principle possible, because although joy is not the same as the supreme good of good character, but is only an offspring (epigennēma) of that,112 it is still classed by the Stoics as a good.113 It may seem to create a further problem if sages rejoice in, and also wish for, good in other people, because that good is not under their control.114 Moreover, the Stoic sage not only welcomes good character in others, but also wishes it for others, and so wishes something not under his control. Presumably, however, he welcomes it merely in so far as he believes it exists, and wishes it merely with the reservation ‘if nothing prevents’, a reservation more frequently applied to preferred indifferents.

Emotions Temporarily Useful To the Novice, But Eventually To Be Shed Or Replaced By the Sage

Four further acceptable attitudes remain to be discussed. Besides the sparse list of eupatheiai, there are some common or garden emotions which can be welcomed as useful to the novice, although they would eventually be shed or replaced by the sage. I have already given the example of the novice's yearning for good character. It has also been pointed out115 how often the novice who is progressing in character is exhorted by the Stoic Epictetus to feel distress116 or shame117 at his (p.52) present character, to rejoice118 at progress made, or to be cautious119 about mistakes. Likewise Seneca encourages hope, by presenting virtue as a prize to be won.120

The advocacy of shame and distress seems to involve a clash with Chrysippus' reaction to the story of Alcibiades distressed at learning from Socrates of his own bad character.121 There distress was the wrong reaction. Yet this is surprising, because Socrates and Epictetus alike think that self‐dissatisfaction is a vital spur to improvement, and Epictetus says that the novice's reaction to his lectures should be one of agony.122 I have suggested that inner contractions in shame and distress are indeed appropriate to the circumstances, but that there is still something inappropriate about them, which the novice overlooks. For besides being unpleasant they are the antithesis of the calmness of the sage,123 who at most suffers only little preliminary contractions. Rejoicing at progress is also not altogether appropriate, for progress is not itself a good, but a preferred indifferent,124 so the joy which judges it a good is mistaken. As for the novice's caution, this, when it is an emotion at all, is one that occurs randomly and is likely to be wrong about what to avoid. If these mistaken pathē are none the less approved for pedagogic purposes, this is no more than we find with the technique of Evagrius, to be discussed in Chapter 23, who finds emotions or temptations useful at the stage when they are being played off against each other, in order to weaken them, although they are in the end to be eliminated.

Prothumia : Instinctive Inclination

Another acceptable reaction was prothumia. We have noticed Plutarch complaining that prothumia (Latin desiderium naturae) was distinguished from ordinary appetite as acceptable, and Cicero agrees.125 The best interpretation of prothumia is that it is a preliminary instinctive inclination prior to an assent.126 We have a prothumia to join in play with children, to talk with responsive people, sheep have (p.53) a prothumia to eat the right sort of grass.127 Our prothumia for sex can make us take up our natural duties in the family.128 Presumably prothumiai have to be allowed because they are involuntary, although development into an epithumia or appetite would be voluntary.

A preliminary inclination will not yet involve assent. Perhaps it is sometimes simply an appearance that something is good. Such appearances can lead to the first movements which will be discussed in Chapter 4, including involuntary erections and reachings towards, and such first movements might also be included under the heading of prothumia.

Selection (Eklogē) : Seeing the Preferred As Preferred

There is another possible attitude besides seeing the indifferent as good (emotion) and seeing the good as good (eupatheia). For one may instead see preferred indifferents for what they are: as preferred indifferents, appropriate to reach for. The Stoics have a name for this attitude, eklogē, selection, and for seeing dispreferred indifferents as dispreferred indifferents, appropriate to avoid, they use the name apeklogē, disselection.129 As I shall explain in Chapter 13, this means that the Stoic who abandons emotion still has plenty of other sources of motivation. Even without being a sage, he will employ selection and disselection, and we shall see Epictetus explaining that this attitude is the source of a more genuine kind of family affection than the untutored emotional kind.

Wanting With Reservation

There is one final recommended attitude, which I shall discuss further in Chapter 15, namely, qualifying one's desires and expectations with a reservation (hupexairesis, Latin exceptio).130 The most general form of reservation is to add ‘if God wills’, or ‘if nothing prevents’. Expecting with reservation is merely recognizing that things may (p.54) happen otherwise, and so avoiding disappointment. Wanting with reservation is less clear. I suggest it can be perspicuously represented as follows:

I desire (judge appropriate): I shall avoid illness and Zeus' will shall be done,

or failing that (Greek ei de mē ‘but if not’): Zeus' will shall be done.

Reservation is said either to exempt the Stoic from frustration, or at least to lighten any frustration.131 How does it do so? First, all along the Stoic desires that God's will be done and this desire is satisfied. But more than that, although at present the first option is preferred, he is already on this interpretation disposed to abandon it, at latest when he finds he cannot satisfy both conjuncts in it. He would then, according to Epictetus' report of Chrysippus, even come to desire (hormān) illness. Epictetus adds that he might come to will fever, death, or torture.132 Both the continuity of the second desire and the readiness to abandon the first enhance tranquillity.

Practising reservation in your desires could help you to avoid emotion, if the readiness to abandon the option you prefer led you to re‐evaluate that option as something which it is natural and right to prefer, but which is actually only a preferred indifferent.

Reservation, as Tad Brennan has shown, can be exercised by someone in a state of emotion who fails to make this re‐evaluation. It can also be used by someone, whether a sage or not, who is merely selecting indifferents. And it may perhaps be exercised by a sage who is wishing good character, a genuine good, to other people. The attitude is not confined to the sage, although it is said that the sage desires most things only with this qualification,133 and that it is the right attitude to most things because they are indifferent.134

Notes:

(1) The three main sources for the generic emotions and their species are Cicero Tusc. 4. 11–22; Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 110–14; Ps.‐Andronicus On Emotions 1–5(SVF 3. 391, 397, 401, 409, 414). The four most generic emotions are also treated at Galen PHP 4. 2. 1–4, pp. 238–9 de Lacy; Stobaeus vol. 2, p. 90 Wachsmuth. For the species see also Cicero Tusc. 3. 84.

(2) Cicero Tusc. 4. 11.

(3) Andrew Ortony et al., The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Cambridge 1988).

(4) O. H. Green, Emotions (Dordrecht, 1990) 82 ff.

(5) Judgements other than the main two come in only indirectly. In anger, for example, the judgement that it is appropriate to react may depend on further judgements that the injury was intended or undeserved: Seneca On Anger 2.26.3; 2.28.

My account sides with Ledbetter against Frede's ingenious suggestion that Chrysippus has in mind non‐evaluative propositions like ‘Socrates is going to die’, and evaluative ways of assenting to them. See M. Frede, ‘The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul’, in M. Schofield and G. Striker (eds.), The Norms of Nature (Cambridge, 1986), 93–110 at 104–5; Grace M. Ledbetter, ‘The Propositional Content of Stoic Passions’, in K. Voudouris (ed.), Hellenistic Philosophy (The 4th International Conference in Greek Philosophy), vol. 2, pp. 107‐13 (Athens, 1993).

(6) The subspecies can instead be distinguished, e.g. by phenomenological character (heavy, excruciating), by accompanying expectations (unforeseen, no relief expected), by effects (loss of voice), by cause (through magic), by stage of development (incipient, inveterate), by intended reaction (malice aforethought), etc. See the three main sources cited above.

(7) Cicero Tusc. 3.61; 3.68; 3.74; 3.76; 4.14; 4.59; Seneca On Consolation to Marcia 1. 7; Stobaeus 2. 90 lines 11, 14, 16 Wachsmuth; Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1; Galen PHP 4. 7. 5, p. 280 de Lacy.

(8) Cicero Tusc. 3. 83; Seneca Marcia 1. 7.

(9) The ‘appropriate to react’ requirement is found for all four emotions at Cicero Tusc. 4. 14 (cf. for distress 3.61; 3.68; 3.72; 3.74; 3.76; 4. 59); Stobaeus 2. 90 Wachsmuth. It is given for the second definition of pleasure and distress only in Ps.‐Andronicus On Emotions 1(SVF 3. 391). Cf. for anger Seneca On Anger 2. 4, for distress id. Marcia 1.7, and for unspecified emotions Galen PHP 4. 7. 5, p. 280 de Lacy. We shall see in ch. 7 that it is used for distress, on one interpretation, by Chrysippus at Galen PHP 4. 7. 14, p. 284 de Lacy.

(10) Galen PHP 4. 4. 24, p. 256 de Lacy; Stobaeus 2. 90. 14–18; Cicero Tusc. 4. 14; Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1.

(11) e.g. Cicero Tusc. 3. 83.

(12) Contractions and bites have, for example, been seen as impulses, affective reactions (Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), 131, 145), compunctions (W. C. Helmbold, translating Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449 A), affliction (Phillip de Lacy translating Galen PHP 4. 3. 2). Inwood's is a magisterial book from which I have repeatedly learnt, and my different view on the nature of contractions should not conceal my debt.

(13) Stobaeus 2. 90 Wachsmuth; Cicero Tusc. 4. 14; Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1; Galen PHP 4. 7. 5, p. 280 de Lacy.

(14) Stobaeus 2. 88. 16–21 Wachsmuth.

(15) It is sometimes more loosely specified as something more like the distress or grief itself (aegre ferre, aegritudinem or dolorem suscipere, dolere, luctus, lupeisthai;cf. phobeisthai, en tois pathesin einai), or even the behaviour of weeping (loss of tears a second bereavement). See Cicero Tusc. 3.61; 3.68; 3.72; 3.74; 3.82; 4.59; Seneca Marcia 1.7; 2.4; Stobaeus 2. 90. 2–4 Wachsmuth.

(16) Cicero Tusc. 3. 76–7.

(17) Ibid. 3.61; 3.68; 3.70; 3.77–8; 4.61. Stephen White, ‘Cicero among the Therapists’, in G. J. F. Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher (Oxford, 1995), 219–46.

(18) Cic. Tusc. 4.61; 4.67.

(19) Stobaeus 2. 86. 17–18 Wachsmuth (SVF 3. 169). I presume that not every appearance of what is appropriate motivates: not, for example, the appearance that something is appropriate in relation to one of my four personae, before I have considered the other personae.

(20) Galen PHP 4. 7. 14, p. 284 de Lacy.

(21) Cicero Tusc. 3. 13–14; Galen PHP 4. 2. 1–6, p. 238 de Lacy; Ps.‐Andronicus On Emotions 1(SVF 3. 391); Stobaeus 2. 90 Wachsmuth; for distress, appetite, and pleasure see Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7. 111–14.

(22) Galen PHP 4. 2. 4, p. 240 de Lacy.

(23) Ibid.4.7.2, p.280 de Lacy.

(24) Ibid. 4.2.5–6; 4.3.1–2; 5.1.4, pp. 240, 246, 248, 292 de Lacy; cf. 5. 6. 42, p. 334 de Lacy.

(25) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 110; Cicero Tusc. 4. 11, 47; Off. 1. 136; Stobaeus 2. 88. 9 Wachsmuth (SVF 1. 205).

(26) Stobaeus 2. 39. 5 Wachsmuth makes the attribution to Zeno (SVF 1. 206).

(27) Zeno is reported in Cicero Tusc. 3. 75 as adding the word ‘fresh’ to ‘judgement of present evil’ in the definition of distress. The definition is also described at Galen PHP 4. 7. 2–3, p. 280 de Lacy, as having been pronounced by Zeno and written out by Chrysippus. (It is not clear that Zeno in particular is referred to at Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 111: ‘They think the emotions are judgements.’)

(28) Galen PHP 4. 7. 2–3.

(29) Stobaeus 2. 90 Wachsmuth.

(30) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 114.

(31) Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 178, 180; Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449 A–B, translated in ch. 3 below; similarly Augustine City 9. 4, discussed in ch. 3. The only differences, on this view, are that the initial contractions tend to be smaller and are caused by mere appearance, not by judgement, i.e. not by assent to the appearance.

(32) Galen PHP 4. 7. 4, p. 280 de Lacy.

(33) Ibid.4.7.13–14, p.284 de Lacy.

(34) Ibid. 4. 7. 14, p. 284 de Lacy.

(35) Ibid. PHP 4. 7. 5, p. 280 de Lacy; Stobaeus 2. 90. 14 Wachsmuth.

(36) Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1; Stobaeus 2. 90. 11 Wachsmuth.

(37) Cicero Tusc. 4. 14.

(38) Galen PHP 2.8.4; 3.1.25; 3.5.43–4; 3.7.4, pp. 158, 172, 208, 212 de Lacy.

(39) Cicero Tusc. 3.82–3; 4.14–15; Galen PHP 4. 3. 2, p. 248 de Lacy.

(40) Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449 A (SVF 3. 439); Galen PHP 2.8.4; 2.8.18, pp. 158, 160 de Lacy; Cicero Tusc. 3.83; 4.15.

(41) Chrysippus' arguments for this conclusion are the subject of Teun Tieleman's excellent dissertation, Galen and Chrysippus: Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis 2–3 (diss. Utrecht, 1992), subsequently published as Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul (Leiden, 1996).

(42) Galen PHP 2.8.4; cf. 2.8.8; 2.8.18, pp. 158 and 160 de Lacy.

(43) Galen quoting Chrysippus at PHP 3. 5. 43–4, p. 208 de Lacy.

(44) Ibid. 3. 1. 25, p. 172 de Lacy. The omission of sun‐from sunaisthanomenoi in the shorter version of this quotation at 2. 7. 8 is corrected at 2. 7. 9.

(45) Galen does not acknowledge the similar difference at PHP 2. 7. 8 and 10, where Chrysippus switches from talk of as it were perceiving the emotion (pathē) to talk of perceiving the disturbance (tarakhē). Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus: Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis 2–3, 162–3, 233, does not take the interpretation of ‘as if’ offered here.

(46) Ibid.3.7.4, p.212 de Lacy.

(47) I thank Anthony Savile for pressing this question.

(48) Justin Gosling and Christopher Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford, 1982), 426–7, interpreting the primis sensibus doloris voluptatisque (‘the first sensations of pain and pleasure’) which, according to the Platonist Taurus, a Stoic child is allowed to experience before it has reached the stage of being able to give rational assent: Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 12. 5. 8.

(49) Stobaeus 2. 81. 13–15 Wachsmuth; hēdonēperisōma.

(50) Cicero Tusc. 4. 15, recessus animi, rightly cited by Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 297 n. 85; Galen PHP 3. 5. 43–4, p. 208 de Lacy, translated above, sundromē, sunizanousin, sunagomenoi. At Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449 A, sunthroēseis (‘perplexities’) or sunorouseis (an unattested compound of orouseis, a type of impulse) in place of the unknown suneorseis are current conjectures. But ‘perplexities’ and ‘impulses’ do not fit the context, which tells us that the Stoics talk about bites and suneorseis instead of distress and fear. Sunathroiseis, ‘massing together’, would fit perfectly both with bites on the one hand and with the concomitants of fear cited by Cicero and Galen: recessus, sundromē, sunizanousin, sunagomenoi.

(51) Galen PHP 3. 1. 25, p. 172 de Lacy, translated above.

(52) Galen thinks the bite is due to yellow bile running down into the stomach: On Demonstration, book 3, as quoted by Nemesius On the Nature of Man ch. 21. Gregory of Nyssa On the Creation of Man 12. 4 takes the same view. Plotinus insists the expansion (diakhusis) in pleasure must belong to body, not soul, and correspondingly with distress, 3. 6. 3 (17–19).

(53) Plutarch Against Colotes 1122 C.

(54) Stobaeus 2. 88. 4 Wachsmuth (SVF 3. 171).

(55) Seneca On Anger 2. 3. 5 (three times); cf. 2. 1. 5.

(56) Ibid. 2.3.4; 2.3.5.

(57) Ibid. 2. 3. 5.

(58) Plato Sophist 263 E–264 D;cf. Republic 603 A.

(59) Aristotle On the Soul 3. 3, 428a18–24.

(60) Id. Rhet. 2. 1–11.

(61) Aspasius In EN 44. 33–45. 10.

(62) Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1. When Seneca says that the second movement in anger is with, rather than just is, an act of will, this is because the act of will is only one of the two constituent judgements, the other being the judgement of good or bad.

(63) Stobaeus 2. 88. 1 Wachsmuth.

(64) Ibid. 2. 86. 17–18 Wachsmuth (SVF 3. 169). I am grateful to Tad Brennan, who makes this passage central to his own interpretation.

(65) Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1.

(66) Plutarch On the Contradictions of the Stoics 1037 F. Cf. Spinoza Ethics part 2, proposition 49, corollary: will and intellect are the same.

(67) Aristotle On the Soul 3. 9, 432a22–b7.

(68) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 110; Galen PHP 4.2.8; 4.2.14–18, pp. 240–2 de Lacy; and Ps.‐Andronicus On Emotions 1(SVF 3. 391).

(69) Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa (2 vols.; Göttingen, 1947–9), vol. i, p. 319. For replies see John Rist, Stoic Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1969), ch. 12; Brad Inwood, ‘The Will and the Self in Seneca’, in preparation.

(70) Seneca Letter 31. 18.

(71) Id. Letter 37. 5. I have not seen Letter 92. 3 cited, but the possibility mentioned there of will deserting reason is only one of its deserting right reason.

(72) A. C. Lloyd, ‘Emotion and Decision in Stoic Philosophy’, in John Rist (ed.), The Stoics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), 233–46 at 237; Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 52; Troels Engberg‐Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis (Aarhus, 1990), 175.

(73) Plutarch On Moral Virtue 446 F–447 A (LS 65 G).

(74) Cicero Academica 2. 108.

(75) Id. Tusc. 3.64; 3.66; 3.80; 3.83; 4.14; 4.65; Acad. 1. 39; Seneca On Anger 2.2.2, 2.4.1; Epictetus in Aulus Gellius 19. 1, translated below in ch. 24.

(76) Jean‐Paul Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, trans. Philip Mairet (London, 1962), from the French of 1939.

(77) Seneca On Anger 2. 2. 1–2.

(78) Charles Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine’, in J. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), The Question of Eclecticism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), 234–59. The connection is clearly exploited in Seneca On Anger 2. 4. 1 and Epictetus as translated into Latin by Aulus Gellius, 19. 1. 15–16 (translated in ch. 24).

(79) Cicero Tusc. 3.80; 3.82; 3.83; Seneca On Anger 1.5.2–3; 2.1; Lactantius is on the other side at Divine Institutes 6. 15.

(80) Cicero Tusc. 3. 65–70.

(81) Ibid. 3. 74.

(82) Sextus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3. 235.

(83) Id. Against the Mathematicians 11. 156–7.

(84) Cicero Tusc. 4. 38; Lactantius Divine Institutes 6. 15.

(85) Lucretius On the Nature of Things 3. 310; Philodemus On Anger col. 39. 29–31; col. 40. 19–26.

(86) C. Diano, ‘La psicologia di Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni’, in his Scritti epicurei (Florence, 1974), 129–280 at 255.

(87) Alcinous Didaskalikos ch. 32. 185. 27–32, as stressed by Victor Caston in a presentation to Cambridge workshop on Didaskalikos, 2 June 1995.

(88) David Sachs, review of Robert Solomon The Passions, in Philosophical Review (1978), 472–5.

(89) Bernard Williams in Problems of the Self (Cambridge, 1973), article reprinted from 1970.

(90) Augustine The Literal Interpretation of Genesis 9. 14. 25; On the Spirit and the Letter 54.

(91) Descartes Fourth Meditation. Thomas Aquinas takes a more restricted view. Consent is an act of will, but assent is an act of intellect, and intellect is only sometimes moved by will: Summa Theologiae 1.2, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3; 2.2, q. 1, a. 4; 2.2, q. 2, a. 2.

(92) Ps.‐Andronicus On Emotions 6(SVF 3. 432). The three generic kinds are also defined here, and at Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 116; Cicero Tusc. 4. 12–13. The subspecies are listed, but not defined, by Diogenes Laertius.

(93) The definition of agapēsis, missing here, may be partly supplied by Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 2, ch. 9, sec. 42(SVF 3. 292): complete acceptance (apodexis).

(94) Joy is an expansion or lift (eparsis): Ps.‐Andronicus On Emotions 6(SVF 3. 432); Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 116; and cf. Seneca Letter 59. 2; Alexander In Top. 181. 4; Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 2, ch. 16, sec. 72.1, p. 466 Pott (SVF 3. 433–5).

(95) Cicero Tusc. 4. 12–14.

(96) Seneca Letter 59. 16.

(97) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 98; Stobaeus 2. 69. 3–4 Wachsmuth.

(98) Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449 A–B.

(99) Cicero Tusc. 4. 12–13(SVF 3. 438); Seneca Letter 59. 2(SVF 3. 435).

(100) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 177 (SVF 1. 624); Athenaeus Sophists at Dinner 8, 354 E (SVF 1. 624).

(101) Cicero Tusc. 4. 14(SVF 3. 438); Lactantius Divine Institutes 6. 15(SVF 3. 437).

(102) Seneca On Anger 1.16.7; 2.2.2; Letter 11. 1, on the sage. Id. Natural Questions 2. 59. 3: we cannot be inconcussi, free of shocks, despite our hopes. Epictetus allows that the Stoic may turn pale, a physical first movement, in the fragment preserved by Aulus Gellius 7. 19. 1 ff., to be discussed in ch. 24. For once, I am not persuaded by Adolf Bonhöffer's evidence that in Epictetus the sage is free of bites (Epiktet und die Stoa (Stuttgart, 1890), 309–10). I think the evidence only shows that it is a sign of moral progress when the occasions for bites can be reduced, not that the sage can escape them altogether.

(103) Cicero Tusc. 4. 61.

(104) Adolf Bonhöffer's work remains a major classic: Epiktet und die Stoa, 287; Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet (Stuttgart, 1894), 48, trans. William O. Stephens as The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus (New York, 1996), 79–80.

(105) I am grateful to Tad Brennan for this point: Stobaeus 2.87.20–2; 2.75.1–6 Wachsmuth, with Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 239–40.

(106) Plotinus 6. 7. 35 (24–6).

(107) Plato Phaedrus 247 D 4; Rep. 615 A 3.

(108) Proclus In Remp. 2. 303. 1–4; Damascius In Phileb. § 87.1–4; 190 (see Gerd van Riel, Pleasure and the Good: Plato's Philebus and its Influence in Ancient Philosophy (diss. Leuven, 1996)).

(109) Philo Who is the Heir 21.

(110) Id. Questions on Genesis 2. 57.

(111) Stobaeus 2. 101. 24–102. 2 Wachsmuth; Plutarch On Common Notions 1068 F; 1069 A (SVF 3. 626–7).

(112) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 94; Epictetus frag. 52 Schweighäuser; cf. Epictetus 3. 7. 7.

(113) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 96; Stobaeus 2.58.5–9; 2.72.1–6 Wachsmuth; cf. Epictetus 3.7.7.

(114) Tad Brennan has pointed out this problem to me.

(115) Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, 296, 302, 304.

(116) Epictetus 3.23.30 and 37; 3.19.1; 4.9.10; 4.10.3.

(117) Ibid.3.7.27;id. Handbook 33. 16; frag. 52 Schweighäuser.

(118) Epictetus 2.5.23; 2.11.22; 2.18.12–14; 3.7.5; 4.4.45–8; id. Handbook 6, 49; frag. 52 Schweighäuser.

(119) Epictetus 2.12.12; 3.16.3.

(120) Seneca Letter 78. 16; On the Constancy of the Sage 15.4.

(121) Cicero Tusc. 3.61; 3.68; 3.70; 3.77–8.

(122) Epictetus 3. 23, 30 and 37.

(123) Cicero Tusc. 4. 61.

(124) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 106(SVF 3. 127); Stobaeus 2. 80. 22–81. 1 Wachsmuth (SVF 3. 136).

(125) Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449 A–B; Cicero Fin. 2. 27.

(126) Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, 248–9.

(127) Epictetus 2. 24. 16; cf. 1. 10. 13.

(128) Epictetus 1.6.9; 2.20.20.

(129) Diogenes Laertius Lives 7. 104–5 (SVF 3. 119); Stobaeus 2. 84. 24–85. 1 Wachsmuth (SVF 3.128; 1.192); 2. 79. 12–17(SVF 3. 118).

(130) e.g. Epictetus Handbook 2, 4; Discourses 2. 6. 9–10; Seneca Ben. 4.34; 4.39; Tranq. 13. 2–3. The standard account of reservation is given by Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 119–26; 165–73. I have benefited enormously from discussion with Tad Brennan, who gives a very different interpretation in ‘Reservation in Stoic Ethics’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (forthcoming), and with Jacques Brunschwig, who takes a different view again, although I have not at the time of writing heard his paper in preparation.

(131) 135. Stobaeus 2. 115. 5 Wachsmuth (SVF 3. 564); Seneca Tranq. 13.2–3;cf. Epictetus Handbook 4.

(132) Epictetus Discourses 2.6.9–10; 4.1.89–90.

(133) Chrysippus in Epictetus Discourses 2. 6. 9–10; Aristo in Sextus Against the Mathematicians 11. 64–7; Arius Didymus in Stobaeus 2.83.14–15; 2.115.5–9 Wachsmuth; Seneca Ben. 4. 34. 4; Tranq. 13. 2–14. 1; Epictetus Handbook 2. 2; frag. 27 from Marcus Aurelius Meditations 11. 37; Marcus Aurelius 4.1; 5.20; 6.50.

(134) Stobaeus 2. 83. 14–15 Wachsmuth.