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Impressions of Hume$
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Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256525

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256525.001.0001

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Transcendental Empiricism? Deleuze's Reading of Hume

Transcendental Empiricism? Deleuze's Reading of Hume

Chapter:
(p.95) Transcendental Empiricism? Deleuze's Reading of Hume
Source:
Impressions of Hume
Author(s):

Martin Bell

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256525.003.0005

This chapter is about how Deleuze read Hume and how that reading contributed to his idea of a transcendental empiricism. In particular it discusses, first, Deleuze's engagement with Hume's empiricism, which he understands to be founded on a thesis of the externality of relations; and, second, what Deleuze calls the problem of subjectivity, which is what he takes Hume's account of human nature to concern. The chapter provides some support for Deleuze's innovative readings and concludes with remarks on a contrast between Deleuze's and Kant's transcendental philosophies, tracing a source for the contrast in Deleuze's and Kant's responses to Hume.

Keywords:   relations, subjectivity, empiricism, transcendental empiricism, transcendental philosophy

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