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Intellectual VirtuePerspectives from Ethics and Epistemology$
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Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199252732

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 November 2019

Knowing Cognitive Selves

Knowing Cognitive Selves

Chapter:
(p.227) 10 Knowing Cognitive Selves
Source:
Intellectual Virtue
Author(s):

Christine McKinnon

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0011

This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.

Keywords:   cognitive virtues, epistemic communities, first-person privileged access, folk psychological theory, knowledge of persons, knowledge of oneself, Christine McKinnon, reliabilism, responsibilism, virtue epistemology

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