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The Nature of Normativity$
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Ralph Wedgwood

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251315

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001

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The Normativity of the Intentional

The Normativity of the Intentional

(p.153) 7 The Normativity of the Intentional
The Nature of Normativity

Ralph Wedgwood (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues for a version of the idea of the normativity of the intentional. First, it explores a particular version of this idea in greater detail. According to this version of the idea, the nature of every concept is given, in part, by a requirement about how it is rational to use that concept; and to possess that concept, one must have some disposition to use it in accordance with the requirement of rationality that is built into the nature of the concept(a similar pair of claims would also be true of each of the various types of attitude — such as belief, desire, intention, and so on). The chapter then argues in favour of this idea; according to this argument, the possession of a concept is a cognitive power, and so cannot rest of any irrational disposition.

Keywords:   intentional, concepts, attitudes, rational, dispositions, possession of concepts

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