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The Nature of Normativity$
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Ralph Wedgwood

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251315

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001

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Expressivism

Expressivism

Chapter:
(p.35) 2 Expressivism
Source:
The Nature of Normativity
Author(s):

Ralph Wedgwood (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0003

Many philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive states of some kind. Such non-cognitivist accounts of normative judgments naturally accompany an expressivist account of the meaning of normative statements. This chapter considers the prospects of such an expressivist theory, taking as its paradigm the most recent theory of Allan Gibbard. It is argued that this theory is vulnerable to a strengthened form of the objection that P. T. Geach derived from the work of Frege. This makes it plausible that expressivist accounts face insuperable problems, and so that both expressivism and non-cognitivism should be rejected.

Keywords:   internalism, non-cognitivism, Allan Gibbard, P. T. Geach, Gottlob Frege

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