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Thought, Reference, and ExperienceThemes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans$
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José Luis Bermúdez

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248964

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001

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Space and Objective Experience

Space and Objective Experience

(p.258) 8 Space and Objective Experience
Thought, Reference, and Experience

Quassim Cassam (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that Evans was unsuccessful in his attempts to establish that in order to have the idea of an objective world one must also have the idea of a spatial world. It doubts his suggestion that the Kantian thesis cannot be defended without showing that the idea of space is implicitly involved in the very idea of existence unperceived. A different and better approach was suggested by Kant in the first Critique. According to Kant, it is the perception of space rather than the idea of space that should be seen as necessary for objective experience. The chapter considers the respects in which this version of the Kantian thesis fares better than Evans's account of the link between space and objectivity. It rejects Kant's idealist explanation of this link. It outlines an explanation that does not depend on Kant's idealism.

Keywords:   Gareth Evans, Spatiality Thesis, epistemic conditions, Kant, idealism, space

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