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Thought, Reference, and ExperienceThemes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans$
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José Luis Bermúdez

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248964

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001

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Information Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Molyneux's Question

Information Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Molyneux's Question

Chapter:
(p.195) 6 Information Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Molyneux's Question
Source:
Thought, Reference, and Experience
Author(s):

John Campbell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0007

This chapter addresses some of the central issues raised by Evans's paper ‘Molyneux's question’, exploring how Evans's approach to Molyneux's question is informed by his account of the content of conscious perceptual experience, as developed in The Varieties of Reference. It takes issue with Evans's account of the content of perceptual experience, and in particular with what he sees as its conflation of subpersonal information processing content and personal-level experiential content.

Keywords:   Gareth Evans, conscious perceptual experience, conceptual content, nonconceptual content, egocentric space

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