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Thought, Reference, and ExperienceThemes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans$
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José Luis Bermúdez

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248964

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001

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Identity, Vagueness, and Modality *

Identity, Vagueness, and Modality *

(p.290) 9 Identity, Vagueness, and Modality*
Thought, Reference, and Experience

E.J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter evaluates Evans's very influential one-page article ‘Can there be vague objects?’ It argues that Evans's purpose was to demonstrate, by means of a reductio ad absurdum proof, that there cannot fail to be a fact of the matter as to whether an object a is identical to an object b. It questions the validity of the proof by comparing it with another notorious ‘proof’ of a metaphysically contentious doctrine, the Barcan–Kripke proof of the necessity of identity.

Keywords:   Gareth Evans, object, Barcan–Kripke, identity

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