Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Rights, Culture and the LawThemes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Thomas W. Pogge

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248254

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248254.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 August 2019

Stronger Reasons

Stronger Reasons

Chapter:
(p.17) 2 Stronger Reasons
Source:
Rights, Culture and the Law
Author(s):

RÜDIGER BITTNER

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248254.003.0002

It is commonly believed that reasons are normative, which seems to entail: ‘What you have reason to do, you ought to do’. This may be amended to: ‘What you have strongest reason to do, you ought to do’. The emphasis is on strongest reason, not the strongest reason. One may have the strongest reason (among all the reasons available) for doing one thing, but he or she has strongest reason to do another. The idea is that in this case, one ought to take the latter course of action. However, it is not clear what the sentence ‘What you have strongest reason to do, you ought to do’ means. This chapter discusses Joseph Raz's explication of this and argues that it is not satisfactory. It then offers a better one and discusses its implications for the supposed normativity of reasons. Harry Frankfurt's ideas about caring are also considered, along with issues of conflict and incommensurability with respect to reasons.

Keywords:   Joseph Raz, reasons, normativity, stronger reason, Harry Frankfurt, conflict, incommensurability

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .