Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Pears

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247707

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247707.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 October 2019

Logical Necessity

Logical Necessity

Chapter:
(p.65) 4 Logical Necessity
Source:
Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy
Author(s):

David Pears

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247707.003.0004

Wittgenstein's anthropocentric treatment of logic is more difficult to accept, and even understand, than his anthropocentric treatment of the regular application of general words. There are also two further reasons for the greater difficulty of his account of logical necessity. One is that its Conventionalism, with its strong hint of artificiality, steals the limelight, while its Voluntarism, which has no such implication, stands behind it in the shadows and fails to cancel the implication of capriciousness. The other, more general, reason is that both his Conventionalism and his Voluntarism seem to be inconsistent with his rejection of all theorizing in philosophy. These two stumbling-blocks are connected in a way that will be explained, and their importance will be shown in the detailed exposition of his account of logical necessity.

Keywords:   logic, word, Conventionalism, Voluntarism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .