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Freedom and Belief$
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Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001

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Non‐rational Commitment: A View of Freedom

Non‐rational Commitment: A View of Freedom

Chapter:
(p.72) 5 Non‐rational Commitment: A View of Freedom
Source:
Freedom and Belief
Author(s):

Galen Strawson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.003.0005

This chapter discusses P. F. Strawson's well known article ‘Freedom and Resentment’. It sets out Strawson's position and raises a number of doubts. Strawson argues, among other things, that our commitment to belief in freedom is founded in our emotions and in particular in our emotional reactions to others, such as gratitude and resentment. This, he says, is the fundamental reason why we could never give up belief in freedom. Strawson also questions whether it would be rational to give up belief in freedom, if one discovered that determinism was true and accepted that it was incompatible with freedom. He compares our commitment to belief in freedom to our non-rational commitment to inductive practices.

Keywords:   Strawson, belief in freedom, resentment, gratitude, determinism, Freedom and Resentment

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