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Freedom and Belief$
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Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001

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Kant and Commitment

Kant and Commitment

Chapter:
(p.52) 3 Kant and Commitment
Source:
Freedom and Belief
Author(s):

Galen Strawson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.003.0003

This chapter considers Kant's theory of freedom. Kant thinks that our experience of being subject to the Moral Law has the consequence that we cannot help experiencing ourselves as truly, radically free to choose. Various questions arise. For example: (1) Does Kant think that there is a sense in which we really are radically free ‘from a practical point of view’, i.e., as regards action, precisely because we cannot help experiencing ourselves as free? (2) Could a being that had no conception of morality none the less experience itself as radically free? (3) Is is really true that we — human beings — are bound to experience ourselves as radically free? (4) Is believing one is free perhaps a necessary condition of freedom, even if it is not sufficient?

Keywords:   Kant, theory of freedom, radically free, Moral Law, experience, conditions of freedom

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