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Freedom and Belief$
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Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001

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Antinomy and Truth

Antinomy and Truth

(p.269) 16 Antinomy and Truth
Freedom and Belief

Galen Strawson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It seems that there is a fundamental sense in which we cannot be truly free or ultimately morally responsible agents. But does this matter? Certainly we want to be free, but do we really want to be truly or ultimately responsible for our actions? We are often entirely free in the ‘basic’ (and wholly compatibilist) Humean sense mentioned in Chapter 1. That is, we are very often entirely free in the sense of being able to do what we want or choose or decide to do. Is this not enough? Is this notall that really matters, in the way of freedom? What more could anyone possibly reasonably want? This chapter considers this question, asking, for example, whether our notions of love and gratitude require a stronger notion of freedom than is possible.

Keywords:   love, gratitude, Hume, ultimate responsibility, truth, compatibilism

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