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Freedom and Belief$
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Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001

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Subjectivism and Experience of Freedom

Subjectivism and Experience of Freedom

(p.257) 15 Subjectivism and Experience of Freedom
Freedom and Belief

Galen Strawson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The conclusion so far is that believing that one is radically free is indeed a necessary condition of being radically free. But this claim still seems to contravene the principle of independence in an unacceptable way. It still seems that the belief in one's radical freedom can be fully justified only if it can be shown that one is radically free quite independently of the fact that one believes that one is. This chapter makes one last attempt to solve this problem. The final proposed analysis of free agenthood is this. If we are free agents, then a free agent is a (1) fully self-conscious, (2) integrated or engaged, (3) purposive agent that is (4) able to choose and is (5) fully self-consciously aware of this and (6) believes it is (or experiences itself as) free.

Keywords:   belief in freedom, principle of independence, purposive agent, free agenthood

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