Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Good Knowledge, Bad KnowledgeOn Two Dogmas of Epistemology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Stephen Hetherington

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247349

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 December 2019

Gettier cases

Gettier cases

Chapter:
(p.70) 3 Gettier cases
Source:
Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge
Author(s):

Stephen Hetherington

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.003.0003

Where this chapter stands on the issue of what epistemologists call the ‘Gettier problem’ is much as Chapter 2 stood on the issue of sceptical worries. It argues for a correspondingly non-standard interpretation of Gettier cases, the kind of puzzling cases first described by Edmund Gettier (1963). This interpretation will also provide further support for the hypothesis that epistemic absolutism is false.

Keywords:   Gettier problem, Edmund Gettier, epistemic absolutism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .