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Kant's Empirical Realism$
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Paul Abela

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199242740

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242740.001.0001

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Truth and the Constraint of Possible Experience

Truth and the Constraint of Possible Experience

(p.214) 4 Truth and the Constraint of Possible Experience
Kant's Empirical Realism

Paul Abela

Oxford University Press

The Transcendental Dialectic portion of the Critique of Pure Reason poses a potential obstacle to the realist interpretation. The elementary worry is that empirical realism may be vulnerable to Immanuel Kant's own attacks on transcendental realism expressed most clearly in the Dialectic portion of the Critique. The chief task of the Dialectic is to delineate the legitimate boundary conditions for knowledge. It is therefore expected that it is within the framework of the Dialectic that the empirical realist conception of truth, and the determinacy of nature, will be subjected to scrutiny. This chapter looks at Kant's claim that all knowledge is restricted to the framework of possible experience and that the reality of the intrinsic causal relations of the phenomenal world can transcend the idiosyncratic limits of what experience reveals.

Keywords:   Critique of Pure Reason, empirical realism, Immanuel Kant, transcendental realism, Dialectic, truth, nature, knowledge, experience

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