This introduction begins with a discussion of the principal claim of the book, which is that reference and truth have an explanatory role to play in the nature of understanding and concept-possession, an explanatory role that is deeper and more extensive than is commonly envisaged — either by opponents of truth-conditional theories, or even by some of their supporters. Part I of the book attempts to extract a general model of understanding from examples and defend it by its explanatory powers. Part II applies the general model outlined in Part I to various mental concepts. These include the concept of a subject of conscious states, and the concepts of perception and action, both bodily and mental. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.
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