Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Truly Understood$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Christopher Peacocke

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199239443

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 February 2020

Conclusion

Conclusion

Chapter:
(p.319) Conclusion
Source:
Truly Understood
Author(s):

Christopher Peacocke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0010

This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of understanding. They can support a realistic treatment of truth and reference, and can do so in a way that is superior to justificationist, pragmatist, and pure conceptual-role theories of content. Current issues in philosophy and its adjacent cognitive sciences that require a substantive theory of sense for its resolution are presented.

Keywords:   reference, understanding, truth, philosophy, cognitive science

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .